Corporate real estate disposal impacts on corporate performance by Louko, Antti
Kiinteistöopin ja talousoikeuden julkaisuja 
Espoo 2006      A 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE REAL ESTATE DISPOSAL IMPACTS  
ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE  
 
Antti Louko 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Technology to be presented, with due permission, for public 
examination and debate in Auditorium E at Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland, on the 20th 
of October 2006, 12 o’clock noon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Helsinki University of Technology 
Department of Surveying 
Institute of Real Estate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teknillinen korkeakoulu 
Kiinteistöopin laboratorio 
PL 1200 
02015 TKK 
Puh.  (09) 451 3871 
Telefax (09) 465 077 
E-mail: real.estate.studies@hut.fi 
 
© Antti Louko 
 
ISBN 951-22- 8394-8 (printed) 
ISBN 951-22- 8395-6 (pdf) 
(http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2006/isbn9512283956) 
ISSN 0785-5079 
 
 
Otamedia Oy 
Espoo 2006 
 
 
 
 1
ABSTRACT 
The discussion of whether to own or lease corporate real estate has increased a lot in 
Europe during the past ten years. Academic writings have indicated that corporate real 
estate is a non-core function that should be outsourced to professionals.  
 
This doctoral thesis´ first aim was to describe the main reasons for the major 
corporate real estate disposals carried out in Europe in recent years. The second aim 
was to identify how the corporations have been able to meet the goals set for the 
disposals and what has been the disposal impact on their performance. The 
corporations’ main achievements and difficulties during and after the disposal process 
were also discussed. The thesis also gave views on how the market for real estate sale 
and leasebacks is going to develop in the future in Finland. Based on the information 
gathered from the previous European real estate disposals, this doctoral thesis built a 
framework which corporations can use when they are making decisions about their 
real estate ownership. 
 
Corporate real estate often requires several strategies because of the different business 
functions that need to be supported. This means that also the optimal technique to 
finance corporate real estate should differ between asset types. Nevertheless, when the 
opportunity cost of the capital tied in corporate real estate and the different risk-return 
profile of real estate compared to corporate core businesses have been taken into 
account, the ownership of CRE seems often questionable. Further, there seems to be 
proof that the stock markets often valuate corporate real estate incorrectly meaning 
that corporations can obtain abnormal stock market gains through real estate 
disposals. Despite these facts, still many successful corporations own a lot of real 
estate. One common reason for this is that lease contracts can in the worst case be 
very inflexible long-term commitments. 
 
It is clear that if a corporation decides to divest its corporate real estate holdings, it 
should do this during good times. Disposing real estate in financial distress will 
usually lead to bad deal terms that can create problems in the future. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Keskuskelu siitä, onko yrityksen järkevää omistaa vai vuokrata kiinteistönsä, on 
lisääntynyt merkittävästi Euroopassa viimeisten kymmenen vuoden aikana. 
Akateemisissa kirjoituksissa on tuotu esille, että kiinteistöjen omistaminen ei ole 
yrityksen ydinliiketoimintaa ja siksi se olisi syytä ulkoistaa ammattilaisille.  
 
Tämän tutkimuksen ensimmäinen tavoite oli kuvata pääsyyt yritysten 
kiinteistöomistusten huomattaville myynneille Euroopassa viime vuosina. 
Tutkimuksen toinen tärkeä tavoite oli selvittää, miten yritykset saavuttivat 
kiinteistömyynneille asettamansa tavoitteet ja kuinka myynnit vaikuttivat yritysten 
suorituskykyyn. Myös kiinteistömyyntien mukanaan tuomat päähyödyt ja –haitat sekä 
ongelmat myyntiprosessin aikana selvitettiin perusteellisesti. Tutkimus toi myös 
lisävalaistusta siihen, miten kiinteistöjen myynti- ja takaisinvuokrausmarkkinat 
tulevat jatkossa kehittymään Suomessa. Lisäksi tutkimuksessa rakennettiin yrityksen 
omistaa vai vuokrata -problematiikkaan viitekehys perustuen havaintoihin ja 
kerättyyn tietoon.  
 
Yritys tarvitsee monesti useita eri kiinteistöstrategioita, koska yrityksen 
kiinteistötoimen täytyy tukea monenlaisia toimintoja. Siksi myös optimaalinen tapa 
rahoittaa kiinteistöjä vaihtelee usein kiinteistötyypin mukaan. Tästä huolimatta, kun 
pääoman vaihtoehtoiskustannus ja kiinteistöjen ydinliiketoiminnasta poikkeava 
riskiprofiili huomioidaan, kiinteistöjen omistaminen vaikuttaa usein kyseenalaiselta 
yrityksille, joiden ydinliiketoimintaa ei ole kiinteistösijoittaminen. Lisäksi vaikuttaisi 
siltä, että osakemarkkinat eivät osaa arvostaa yritysten kiinteistöomistuksia oikein, 
minkä takia yritysten on mahdollista saavuttaa epänormaaleja osakemarkkinatuottoja 
kiinteistömyyntien avulla. Tästä huolimatta monet yritykset omistavat yhä merkittäviä 
kiinteistömassoja. Yksi yleinen syy tälle on, että pitkäaikaiset vuokrasopimukset 
voivat pahimmillaan olla hyvin joustamattomia sitoumuksia liiketoiminnan 
muutostilanteissa.  
 
Selvää on, että jos yritys päättää ulkoistaa kiinteistöomistuksiaan, tämä tulisi tehdä 
hyvänä aikana. Kiinteistöomistusten myynti ja takaisinvuokraus huonona aikana 
saattaa johtaa merkittäviin ongelmiin. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  CRE research in the past and this study’s contribution 
There has been a fast increase in large corporate real estate (CRE) divestments in 
Europe during the late 1990s and the beginning of this century. Many corporations 
have been divesting their real estate holdings, outsourcing related services and 
focusing all their efforts on corporate core businesses. This has happened in the wake 
of the fast adaptation to the shareholder value principles in Europe in the 1990s.  
 
Many corporations have recognized that by redirecting the capital tied in CRE into the 
corporate core business, it is possible to obtain competitive advantage through, among 
others, increased corporate capital-use and real estate asset management efficiency. 
The outsourcing boom has not only touched the CRE function, but corporations have 
been outsourcing also other business areas. In general, corporations tend to 
concentrate on areas where it is possible to create highest possible economic profit 
through superior industry knowledge. 
 
There is still a clear lack of empirical literature and studies in the field of CRE 
ownership and finance, particularly concerning the leasing and buying decision of 
CRE. Krumm (1999) suggests that the majority of the CRE research available is 
primarily focused on describing the current role and position of real estate 
departments, and in general the amount of CRE research available in comparison with 
the amount of research available in the other corporate management fields is still very 
little. It is easy to agree with Krumm in this issue. 
 
In addition, it is easy to notice that most of the empirical CRE research comes from 
the Anglo-Saxon countries (the USA and the UK), and research on CRE issues in 
continental and Northern Europe is still rather rare. Nevertheless, the CRE holdings’ 
significant role in corporate asset portfolios is today recognized more clearly than 
ever before also in continental and Northern Europe and the amount of empirical 
research is increasing also in these countries. This is because many continental and 
Northern European corporations are already in need of reorganizing their real estate 
functions to be able to create flexibility due to today’s fast changing global business 
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environment and to be able to release capital that could be used better in the corporate 
core business areas.  
 
During the past few years, this has led to an increasing interest on CRE research also 
in Finland. Many corporations have understood that CRE can have also other roles 
than just an input in the corporate production process and that by reorganization CRE 
and its management, corporations can achieve significant benefits.  
 
This thesis aimed to increase the awareness of the Finnish and European corporations 
and academics concerning the significant importance of CRE holdings in corporate 
asset portfolios. The thesis intended to show how divestments and sale and leasebacks 
(SLBs) of CRE assets could be used to increase shareholder value and corporations’ 
competitiveness. Even today, at a time when shareholder value is one of the most 
talked about topics in the corporate world, many corporations still neglect the 
possibilities that CRE holdings can provide in driving up the share prices.  
 
The significance of CRE in a corporate asset portfolio can be illustrated simply as its 
share of total corporate assets. For instance, buildings and land (B&L) at historical 
acquisition costs corresponded for, on average, around 28% of Helsinki Stock 
Exchange (HEX) listed corporations’ market capitalization in July 2004 when real 
estate investors were excluded (Louko 2005b). Over 15% of these HEX listed 
corporations had B&L to market capitalization ratios of over 50% at historical costs 
of real estate (Louko 2005b). Thus, it is not surprising that an efficient CRE 
management is becoming an issue that no stock exchange listed corporation can 
simply afford to neglect. This is especially because there is evidence that large 
inefficiently managed CRE holdings can expose corporations to hostile takeovers 
(Ambrose 1990).  
 
This doctoral thesis was made for a large part during the years 2003-2004 in a 
research project called ‘Corporate Real Estate Disposals’, which was financed by the 
National Technology Agency in Finland and six corporations (Catella Property 
Consultants, Fortum, Kesko, Metso, NCC Property Development and Wereldhave).  
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1.2  Definitions 
In this thesis sale and leaseback (SLB) is determined as a combination of two 
simultaneous transactions: sale of a property and a simultaneous contract to lease it 
back. Leasing period can usually vary from very long leases (so called financial 
leases) to shorter leases (operational leases). An SLB with long-term financial leases 
might lead to a situation where the leases are left on the seller-corporation’s balance 
sheet based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) standards. This 
is because the actual property related risks are not transferred to the buyer. 
Operational leases, on the other hand, resemble more traditional rental agreements 
and are usually off-balance sheet financing from the tenant’s perspective. Financial 
leases can include all kinds of arrangements providing occupational flexibility for the 
occupier (for instance buy-back, renewal or break-options). Operational leases cannot 
usually include buy-back options, but renewal options and rights of first refusals are 
often acceptable for the accountants. 
 
In this thesis, corporate real estate (CRE) disposal is a more general term for selling a 
large number of CRE. A large CRE disposal can include SLBs on some properties, 
sale of empty space and sale of space already let to third parties. However, disposal 
does not necessarily include restructuring of property asset management services or 
complex inbuilt flexibility. 
 
Corporate real estate (CRE) outsourcing, on the other hand, can include also 
restructuring of CRE management functions in addition to SLBs and sales of empty 
space or space let to third parties. Further, an outsourcing contract may include also 
inbuilt flexibility regarding the properties that are leased back. The flexibility can 
consist, for instance, of break options or renewal options leases, contracts of different 
length and even of possibilities to swap properties or leases in and out from the 
outsourced portfolio. Usually, in the connection of CRE outsourcing also the property 
management functions are reorganized and outsourced. Therefore, CRE outsourcing 
can be a more complex and far-reaching way of performing property portfolio 
restructurings than CRE disposal or a traditional SLB. The intention is to free the 
corporation from several real estate worries at the same time.  
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1.3  Aim, scope and structure 
The thesis aimed firstly at describing the main reasons for the major CRE disposals 
and outsourcings conducted in Europe during the late 1990s and in the beginning of 
this century, and secondly at finding out how the corporations have been able to meet 
the goals set for these disposals and what has been the disposal impact on the 
corporate performance. The corporations’ main achievements and the problems 
during and after the disposal procedures were also discussed throughout. Additionally, 
the thesis gave views on how the market for real estate SLBs and outsourcings is 
going to develop in Finland and in other European countries in the future.  The overall 
research problems presented above were divided into sub-problems and therefore 
different research questions that were posed in the separate research papers.  
 
Based on the information gathered when writing the different research papers and 
based on the overall corporate management and finance theory, this doctoral thesis 
built also a framework that corporations can use when they are making decisions 
concerning their real estate ownership. This framework is presented in this summary 
of the thesis and it tries to answer to the big questions of in which situations a 
corporation should own its real estate holdings and in which situations not. 
 
This doctoral thesis consists of five separate research papers. All of the research 
papers have been scientifically reviewed to meet the requirements of academic 
publications. The author of this doctoral thesis has been fully responsible for planning 
and writing four out of five of these research papers and has contributed significantly 
in the planning and writing of the fifth research paper.  
 
The paper (1) introduced the topic of CRE disposals and SLBs by reviewing the most 
relevant and current research on CRE finance and management from corporate value 
formation’s point of view. It formed a framework of CRE finance and management 
for the other research papers and also introduced the main ways of financing CRE. 
The paper (1) was published in International Journal of Strategic Property 
Management (Vol. 8, No. 1, 2004). The paper (2) and (3) continued where the first 
one ended by discussing empirically and more distinctively the major reasons for real 
estate disposals, outsourcings and SLBs.  
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The paper (2) studied empirically the relationship between the CRE disposals and 
corporate performance ratios. The impact of real estate disposals on corporate 
performance ratios is often mentioned as one of the major reasons for real estate 
SLBs. This paper tried to find out empirically whether the corporations carrying out 
real estate SLBs were achieving major improvements in their performance rations or 
not. The paper (2) was published in International Journal of Strategic Property 
Management (Vol. 8, No. 3, 2004). 
 
The paper (3) concentrated on describing and analyzing four different large-scale 
CRE disposals/outsourcing cases that were carried out in Europe during the past few 
years. The paper (3) discussed on one hand the major drivers for the large real estate 
disposals/outsourcings conducted by the case-corporations and on the other hand the 
outcomes of these disposals. The paper showed how the corporations had reached the 
goals set for the disposals and how the chosen outsourcing structures had functioned.  
The paper (3) was published in Journal of Corporate Real Estate (Vol. 7, No. 1, 2005). 
 
The paper (4), on the other hand, contributed to the CRE research in Finland by 
investigating the real estate ownership ratios of corporations listed in the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange’s (HEX) main list and by finding out the SLB volume during the past 
few years in Finland. Also the development of these figures was discussed. The 
hypothesis that CRE ownership decreases in time across countries and industries was 
put to a test. In addition, the general argument that Finnish corporations would own 
clearly more real estate than the corporations in the US was discussed by comparing 
the Finnish figures with the US figures presented in the previous studies. The paper 
also made suggestions about the future directions of CRE ownership in Finland. The 
paper (4) has been published in Nordic Journal of Surveying and Real Estate 
Research. 
 
The paper (5) was written in co-operation with Prof. Mika Vaihekoski, Ph.D. and 
Tomi Grönlund, M.Sc. (Econ). It discussed the corporate real estate sale and 
leaseback effect on share values in Europe during 1998-2004. This subject has been 
studied several times with a US or UK based data, but never before with a pan-
European data. Further, this study used exceptionally large sample of transactions and 
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presented how the sale and leaseback impact varied across deal sizes, countries and 
industries. In this paper, the author of this thesis contributed mostly to developing the 
theoretical framework and building up the data. The calculations were conducted 
mostly by Mika Vaihekoski. 
 
As stated above, the study methods of the papers vary from a critical literature review 
and a multiple-case study to quantitative empirical investigations to cover the subject 
better from different points of view. All the studies concentrated on describing the 
reasons for CRE disposals and assessing the main outcomes of these transactions. 
Throughout the thesis it was assessed to which extent and in which situations real 
estate outsourcings are a useful tool for corporate management. Further, the different 
real estate outsourcing approaches were presented and analyzed (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Thesis structure 
 
Paper 1: Competitive advantage from CRE Disposals 
• A critical literature review of corporate real estate finance and 
management.
• Forms a theoretical backround and framework for the thesis.
Paper 2: CRE Disposals and 
Corporate Performance Ratios
• An empirical investigation of the 
performance ratio effect and 
corporate performance before the 
disposal.
Paper 3: Four Cases of CRE 
Portfolio Outsourcings
• An empirical investigation of 
four different real estate disposal
cases.
• Disposal aims vs. outcome.
Paper 4: CRE Ownership and 
the Market for SLBs in Finland
• An empirical study of CRE 
ownership and SLBs in Finland.
• Provides also a literature review
of CRE ownership in Europe and 
in the US.
Summary
• Summarizes the main research findings of the papers
•A framework that corporations can use when making decisions of their 
CRE ownership, 
•Answered to the big questions of when to own its CRE and when not
Paper 5: Sale and leasenback
effect
• An empirical study CRE sale and 
leaseback effect on shareholder
value in Europe in 1998-2003.
• Also a short literature review.
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As said, the doctoral thesis consists of five different research papers. The topic 
‘Corporate Real Estate Disposal Impacts on Corporate Performance’ was discussed 
from several different points of view in the research papers.  
 
Paper (1) Competitive Advantage from Corporate Real Estate Disposals. International 
Journal of Strategic Property Management, Number 8, Issue 1, 2004.  
 
Paper (2) Corporate Real Estate Disposal Impact on Corporate Performance Ratios. 
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, Number 8, Issue 3, 2004. 
 
Paper (3) Four Cases of Corporate Real Estate Portfolio Outsourcings. Journal of 
Corporate Real Estate, Volume 7, Number 1, 2005. 
 
Paper (4) Corporate Real Estate Ownership and the Market for Sale and Leasebacks 
in Finland. Nordic Journal of Surveying and Real Estate Research, Volume 2, 
Number 1, 2005. 
 
Paper (5) Corporate Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Effect. European Financial 
Management, accepted to be published. Co-author, other authors are Tomi Grönlund, 
M.Sc and Prof. Mika Vaihekoski,  Ph.D. 
 
1.4  Methodology 
Each of the five research papers discusses the overall research topic from its own 
carefully chosen point of view and has thus its own structure, methodology and 
research questions. The doctoral thesis was structured in this way, because there is not 
only one variable that could be studied to understand SLB impacts on corporate 
performance since corporate performance can be measured in so many ways. Many 
previous studies have discussed just some particular phenomenon related to real estate 
divestments or CRE in general and have not discussed the issue from a wider 
perspective.  
 
Although both quantitative and qualitative research papers are included in this 
doctoral thesis, the overall methodology of the thesis is still primarily qualitative. 
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Qualitative research methods were generally preferred in the thesis since there was, 
on one hand, a need to discuss the subject from several different angles and, on the 
other hand, because it would have been extremely difficult only to quantitatively find 
answers to the research problems that were discussed. Since the studied corporations 
had several qualitative goals for their real estate disposals (such as need for flexibility 
etc.) and many goals that would have been very difficult to measure quantitatively 
(such as space-use and capital-use efficiency), it would have been practically 
impossible to study how well the corporations have achieved their goals purely 
quantitatively.  
 
Further, also the research question of what the main problems in the real estate 
disposals were would have been practically impossible to answer purely 
quantitatively, because the problems can occur in so many ways. Additionally, as Yin 
(1994) has indicated the “how” and “why” questions such as how and why the 
corporations carried out the real estate disposals would have been also nearly 
impossible to answer purely quantitatively. Quantitative research methods were 
preferred in the research papers if there were quantitative goals set for the real estate 
disposals or other research problems that were appropriate to measure quantitatively 
(such as the improvement of the performance ratios or increase in share price).  
 
It was, however, important to have also quantitative data to base the research results 
on, because otherwise it would have been difficult to get neutral and clear evidence of 
how well the corporations had succeeded in their real estate disposals. For instance, it 
can be a difficult task to get unbiased information by just interviewing people because 
it is obvious that corporations like to tell about the issues that succeeded and not about 
the things that went wrong. 
  
In total, two out of five research papers were more quantitative and three out of five 
papers used mainly qualitative research methods. Also the additional research 
problems presented and solved in this summary part of the doctoral thesis were 
tackled qualitatively.  
 
The thesis started with a literature research, which aim was to create a theoretical 
framework and an introduction to the other more empirical papers. The paper (1) 
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discussed the main advantages and disadvantages of operational CRE disposals and 
outsourcings on the basis of the findings in previous scientific literature and studies. It 
also discussed extensively the theoretical real estate disposal effect on corporate value 
formation and the development of the real estate disposal market. Further, it described 
the main techniques and ways to carry out operational CRE disposals and 
outsourcings as well. Because of the extensive literature review in the first paper, it 
was not seen necessary to go through the same literature extensively in all of the five 
papers. However, a comprehensive literature review was added to this summary part 
of the Thesis to support the overall goals of the thesis. 
 
Papers (2), (4) and (5) were based mainly on a quantitative sample, but the research 
methods used in the paper number four were qualitative. The paper (2) consisted 
mainly of a time-series analysis of a sample of corporate financial ratios, which was 
performed to find out on one hand if the sample corporations’ performance ratios 
were enhanced by the CRE disposals and on the other hand if poor performance prior 
to the disposals could have been the reason for the transactions. Statistical testing was 
not originally carried out in the paper number two, because of the small sample of 
data. However, the statistical testing for the data presented in paper (2) was added to 
this summary part of the Thesis to make the study more comprehensive.  
 
The paper (4), on the other hand, investigated the real estate ownership and the real 
estate assets to total assets (and market value) ratios of non-real estate investing 
companies listed in Finland and compared these to the similar data from other 
countries. Statistical testing was not used in the paper number four due to the fact that 
the role of the comparative data which was gathered from the previous studies was 
regarded as more descriptive than exact. The preparation of the research papers one, 
two and four included also an amount of professional interviews that were conducted 
to support the quantitative and qualitative data that was gathered. 
 
Paper (3) was a multiple-case study introducing four different CRE 
disposal/outsourcing cases based on corporate interviews. The paper (3) applied a 
multiple-case study methodology, because this way it was possible  
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1) to compare the differences in portfolio outsourcing structures and deal terms 
and find out the strengths and weaknesses of different portfolio outsourcing 
approaches, and  
2) to present practical real-life examples of property portfolio outsourcings for 
corporations that are currently considering these kinds of procedures. 
 
The paper (5) used standard event study methodology to discover the effect of the sale 
and leaseback announcements on the lessee firm’s stock price from several samples. 
The paper (5) introduced a large new data from the European sale and leaseback 
market. This was the first time that the sale and leaseback effect on corporate share 
prices has been studies so comprehensively and the first time it has been studied in 
Western and Northern European countries at all. 
 
This summary part of the doctoral thesis was prepared, on one hand, to summarize the 
main findings of the five research papers and, on the other hand, to make conclusions 
from the findings of the papers and to present all of the ideas that came up during the 
research process, but were not included in the published research papers. In addition, 
the summary part provides an exhaustive literature review to support the findings 
introduced in the thesis.  
 
Based on the findings of the five research papers and overall view on the topic of the 
CRE disposals, this summary part aims to create a theoretical framework that 
corporations can use when making real estate sale and leaseback and/or buy vs. lease 
decisions. This thesis is the first one which carried out such an exhaustive analysis of 
the topic. 
 
The summary part of the thesis can be divided into four parts: introduction, theoretical 
background, summaries of the five research papers and conclusions. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Corporate real estate asset management  
First studies concerning CRE asset management were carried out in the late 1970s and 
in the beginning of 1980s in the USA.  Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983) were one of 
the first researchers who clearly indicated that at least American corporate managers 
were regularly neglecting their firm’s real estate assets. They suggested that by 
neglecting their CRE assets, which were at that time comprising anywhere from 25% 
to 40% of the total assets of major American corporations at market values, the 
corporations were left open to takeovers, lost profits and lower stock price 
performance. Zeckhauser and Silverman (1979) published their well-known study in 
the Harvard Business Review. Even before Zeckhauser and Silverman, there had been 
American studies that were indicating that corporations’ real estate holdings were 
generally undermanaged.   
 
After the study of Zeckhauser and Silverman, the interest in CRE asset management 
started to increase steadily in the USA. For instance as early as in 1984, Hite et al. 
noticed that by spinning off CRE, corporations could gain abnormal returns for their 
shareholders indicating that CRE holdings might be generally undervalued by the 
stock markets. This undervaluation might have been due to inefficient management of 
the real estate assets or stock-markets inability to valuate CRE assets appropriately.  
 
In 1987, Nourse and Kingery (1987) continued the research of CRE asset 
management by studying whether corporations ignore profitable disposal 
opportunities of surplus real estate, because they are not in real estate business. The 
answer was yes; Nourse’s and Kingery’s survey showed that a majority of 
corporations consistently missed profitable opportunities to dispose surplus real 
estate, which implies that still in the late 1980s, the US corporations did not manage 
real estate holdings carefully. 
 
In 1988, by using standard study methodology, Rutherford and Nourse showed that 
the formation of a CRE unit inside a corporation is, in general, also associated with 
positive gains to shareholders. This result was obviously inline with Hite et al. and 
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their suggestion that real estate spin-offs increase shareholder wealth. Rutherford and 
Nourse added that the largest gains were associated with the publicly traded 
subsidiaries and the second largest gains were associated with the master limited 
partnerships and the wholly owned subsidiaries. The main reasons given to the 
decisions to form the separate real estate units were cost control, income generation, 
suspected under valuation of real estate, special characteristics of real estate, risk 
reduction and tax benefits.  
 
In 1989, Gale and Case (1989) studied the state of CRE management practices. They 
found out that while the dominant view of real estate continued to be as a production 
factor within the sample of corporations, there had been significant growth of CRE 
units during the 1980s in the US, which had been accompanied by increased influence 
and more active real estate resource management, which supported Rutherford’s and 
Nourse’s (1988) suggestions that corporations should do so to be able to maximize 
shareholder wealth. Nevertheless, Gale and Case (1989) also concluded that the 
dominant view of CRE resources as a cost factor of production was only slowly 
shifting and very few corporations saw at that time CRE resources as a profit unit. 
This, of course, meant that many corporations were still not fully using the value 
creation opportunities associated with their CRE holdings, although Rutherford and 
Nourse (1988) had implied that one of the reasons for the creation of real estate 
subsidiaries was income generation.  
 
Rutherford and Stone (1989) contributed to the CRE research by doing a research of 
CRE unit formation process and found out that CRE unit formation by wholly owned 
subsidiaries was likely to be motivated by development and profits while centralized 
and decentralized real estate departments were likely to be motivated by contracting 
efficiency and cost control. Thus, the corporations forming wholly owned subsidiaries 
and following a profit strategy were attempting to make use of CRE in the most 
profitable way whereas centralized or decentralized real estate departments were 
attempting to manage their real estate consistent with the strategies of cost control. 
Therefore, it could be argued based on Rutherford and Stone (1989) that corporations 
forming real estate subsidiaries see CRE more as an asset and will try more actively to 
use it to make profit in the real estate markets than corporations establishing real 
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estate departments, which see CRE holdings more as a factor in the production 
process. The question is which approach is better for the overall corporate success. 
 
Pittman and Parker (1989), on the other hand, studied the factors influencing CRE 
departments’ performance with a survey, which revealed that CRE executives 
consider communications and working relationships with management and operating 
divisions to be extremely important to a top-performing real estate department. 
Further, their results indicated that centralized real estate authority and a senior 
reporting level are significant factors in determining how well respondents’ 
corporations are perceived to match importance with performance. It is difficult to 
assess the results of Pittman and Parker (1989) since they interviewed only CRE 
executives and not corporations’ top management. CRE executives might not always 
have shareholder value development as their primary management goal as the top 
management usually does. Rutherford and Stone (1989) showed that centralized real 
estate department usually concentrates on cost-control and thus does not see real 
estate as a business of its own, which might lead to that the corporation misses 
possibilities for income generation in its real estate business. On the contrary, 
Rutherford and Stone (1989) indicated that by turning CRE department into “a profit 
unit” from “a cost unit”, the CRE utilization should become more efficient as the real 
estate unit would seek continuously money making opportunities. Inefficient real 
estate asset management, on the other hand, might obviously lead to that corporation’s 
real estate portfolio would not be valued to its correct value by the investors and 
hence the corporation itself would be undervalued by the markets. Nevertheless, as 
Pittman and Parker (1989) indicated that it is clear that a senior reporting level is 
necessary for a CRE unit or otherwise it might be difficult for the CRE people to react 
proactively to the possible changes in the corporation’s core business. 
 
Also Veale (1989) studied CRE management in large organizations, which are not in 
real estate business similarly as Zeckhauser and Silverman had done six years earlier. 
Veale (1989) surveyed 284 large US corporations and institutions. The research 
confirmed the fact, which Zeckhauser and Silverman (1983) and other researchers had 
brought up earlier. According to Veale (1989), CRE assets are often seriously under 
managed despite their great value. Further, Veale (1989) added that many CRE 
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managers do not maintain adequate information about the real estate assets and thus 
efficient asset management is impossible. 
 
Glascock et al. (1989) continued the study related to the acquisitions and dispositions 
of CRE by conducting an event-study with a data from 1981-1986. Glascock et al. 
(1989) did not find abnormal performance associated with the buyers of real estate 
assets. Nevertheless, they did find weak evidence of excess returns for the sellers. 
Glascock et al. indicated that the reason why previous studies had shown much larger 
returns for the sellers might be that a direct asset sale does not change the 
organizational forms of the company. On the other hand, for instance, in spin-offs the 
corporate organization changes which could make CRE management more efficient 
and thus lead to efficiency gains. Thus, the findings of Glascock et al. (1989) are 
inline for instance with the findings of Rutherford and Stone (1989) and Hite et al. 
(1984). 
 
Also Miles et al. (1989) noticed that many corporations have the opportunity to 
increase their profitability through more effective management of their real estate. 
According to Miles et al. (1989), this entails evaluating real estate on an on-going 
basis using an approach that treats the interactions of real estate with the capital 
structure, debt capacity, cost of capital and the overall operations of the firm. Further, 
Miles et al. (1989) indicated that the market in general does not have the information 
to recognize the possible underutilization of CRE and cost of obtaining the necessary 
information across a wide range of firms is often prohibitive, which supported the 
suggestions of e.g. Hite et al. (1984) and many other researchers thereafter who has 
suggested that the investors are unable to valuate CRE correctly. Miles et al. (1989) 
summarized that it is very important for corporations to view real estate as an asset 
that can and should be actively managed to achieve corporate goals. 
 
In 1989, Redman and Tanner (1989) surveyed the CRE acquisition and disposition 
decision making criteria and methods in the US. The results of Redman and Tanner 
(1989) indicated that already in the late 1980s over 50% of the US corporations were 
leasing more than half of their business premises. Thus, leasing had become already 
then a common solution for many corporations acquiring real estate in the US.  
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In addition, Avis et al. found out in 1989 that strategic planning of CRE matters was 
rather rare amongst corporations. Thus, corporations acted often more reactively than 
proactively to meet the corporate property needs. 
 
Slovin et al. (1990) studied the corporate sale and leasebacks and their effect on 
shareholders’ wealth. Their sample of announcements over the period of 1975–1986 
included both real estate structures and airplanes with a total number of 53 
observations from the US. Slovin et al. (1990) found out that two-day average 
abnormal return for the sale and leasebacks was 0.85% with t-statistic of 1.98, which 
is significant at 5 percent level. They suggested that unlike most other types of 
external leasing, the sale and leasebacks are value-increasing transactions. They also 
suggested that the positive market perception result from an overall reduction in the 
present value of expected taxes. 
 
Rutherford (1990) and Alvayay et al. (1995) also studied the real estate sale and 
leasebacks and shareholder wealth in the US. The data of Rutherford (1990) consisted 
of 41 transactions that were carried out over the period of 1980–1987. Similar to 
Slovin et al. (1990), Rutherford suggested that the sale and leaseback of CRE has 
substantial benefits for seller-lessee common stockholders. Seller-lessee corporations 
gained an abnormal return of 1.59 % in their study. Rutherford (1990) also added that 
the sale and leasebacks produce an insignificant loss for the corporate purchase-lessor. 
On the other hand, Alvayay et al. (1995) reported positive abnormal returns for the 
seller-lessee corporations only prior to the US Tax Reform Act of 1986. After the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, they found no significant abnormal returns accrued to firms 
involved in a sale and leaseback of CRE. Nevertheless, the sample of Alvavay et al. 
(1995) included only 17 transactions after the year 1986, which obviously raise 
questions. Alvavay et al. (1995) suggested that the changes in marginal tax rates in 
1986 in the US had a significant negative impact on the profitability of sale and 
leasebacks for the seller-lessees. 
 
Johnson and Keasler (1993), on the other hand, continued the earlier CRE research by 
being the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the balance sheet data of the 
CRE holdings of US corporations. Johnson and Keasler (1993) provided an industry 
rank order by gross value of total real estate holdings and asset subtype, real estate as 
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a percent of assets, and real estate relative to market value of the firm. Johnson and 
Keasler (1993) used balance sheet data from 1984-1991. They found out that the 
amount of real estate holdings of US corporations had on average grown. However, 
the growth of the real estate holdings had been much smaller than the average growth 
of the market values of these corporations during the same time period. Thus the 
relative magnitude of CRE ownership has already been decreasing in the US during 
the latter half of the 1980s. The same development is today ongoing in Europe 
according to several researchers. 
 
In 1993, the Arthur Andersen (1993) study showed that there was a wide gap between 
a corporation’s senior management and its senior CRE executives and managers. It 
concluded that the main challenge to CRE was to prove that it is a value-enhancing 
activity and not just an input cost-problem to be amortized as a factor of production. 
Benchmarking was the principal planned activity by CRE personnel for the future. 
Arthur Andersen’s study interestingly showed that although studies had shown before 
that it is extremely important to have close contacts between the corporation’s senior 
management and CRE executives (e.g. Pittman and Parker (1989)), this had not yet 
become reality in the beginning of 1990s.  
 
In 1993, Ball et al. (1993) studied the wealth impacts of real estate spin-offs. They 
found out similarly as Hite et al. (1984) that parent firms of spin-offs experienced 
significant two-day abnormal return of 3.195%. Further, during the same year, Allen 
et al. (1993) were able to show also that in leasing decisions of CRE, the lessee firm 
accrues positive abnormal returns, indicating that leasing should be preferred method 
for real estate acquisitions. This takes some ground away from Glascock’s argument 
that selling CRE does not increase shareholder wealth itself, but the source of the 
abnormal gain is more related to the changes in the organizational structures. In 
addition, the conclusions of Allen et al. (1993) supported the findings of e.g. Slovin et 
al. (1990) and Rutherford (1990), which indicated that shareholder wealth could be 
enhanced with sale and leasebacks. 
 
Nourse and Roulac (1993) wrote about real estate strategies and CRE decisions, in 
their paper “Linking real estate decisions to corporate strategy”.  Nourse and Roulac 
(1993) point out that corporation’s real estate decisions are effective if they support 
 23
corporation’s overall business objectives. This obviously supports the findings of e.g. 
Pittman and Parker (1989) who wrote that it is extremely important to have close 
contacts between the corporation’s senior management and CRE executives. Nourse 
and Roulac (1993) emphasize also that too often CRE transactions are approached 
from a predominantly deal-making rather than strategic posture meaning that while 
many involved in CRE transactions recognize that the process involves a negotiation 
to optimize competing interests, their focus unfortunately is predominantly on 
economic issues, all too often at the expense of other important strategic priorities. 
Therefore, also Nourse and Roulac (1993) come to a conclusion that all too often the 
dominant emphasis tends to be on the financial goal of cost minimization. Thus, 
Nourse and Roulac (1993) see that corporations should be able to consider their CRE 
strategies from a wider perspective than just cost minimization. This supports the 
findings in earlier writings indicating that CRE should be rather regarded more as a 
profit unit than a cost unit for corporations to be able to create maximum added value 
from their real estate operations. Nourse and Roulac’s research also supports the 
findings of However, Nourse and Roulac (1993) extend the previous findings by 
indicating that effective real estate management is not enough, but corporations 
should additionally link their real estate strategies and decision to their corporate 
strategy or otherwise to overall result is not optimal. 
 
In 1994, Nourse (1994) studied CRE performance with a cross-case comparison of 
eleven firms. Nourse (1994) analyzed how real estate performance was measured and 
monitored for managerial feedback to make CRE decisions that will cause real estate 
performance to support overall strategic goals. Nourse (1994) found out that CRE 
performance was more regularly monitored by firms leasing property than by those 
owning property. Nourse (1994) suggested that firms that have good real estate 
information systems usually also have tighter linkage between corporate strategy and 
real estate operations, which also supported the findings of e.g. Veale (1989) who 
emphasized the significance of CRE information systems.  
 
Nevertheless, based on Nourse (1994), we could say that usually corporations that 
prefer leasing instead of CRE ownership have better understanding of their business 
real estate and its performance, and thus can link its real estate strategy more 
effectively to their business strategy. For instance, one interviewee in Nourse’s study 
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said that once a building is owned it is used whether or not it is the best facility for the 
purpose, whereas if facilities are leased, operating units can be moved more easily to 
more profitable locations. This is only one example, but based on Nourse (1994), it 
seems to be clear that it is often easier for corporations to monitor what they actually 
pay and what kind of service they get if they buy it from outside. 
 
In 1996, Cheong and Kim (1996) investigated the relationship between changes in 
real estate prices and the value of firms. The findings using a yearly cross-sectional 
test during 1987-1991 indicated that the proportion of a firm’s real estate holdings to 
total assets had no significant effect upon the return on investment in its stocks. 
Nevertheless, Cheong and Kim did find out that the higher the debt ratio of the firm, 
the lower the co-efficient of the real estate holdings implying that the value loss of the 
growth opportunities forgone becomes larger as the firm uses more debt. According to 
Cheong and Kim this meant that expectations of real estate price increase raise the 
value of assets currently held by the firm on one hand. However, on the other hand, 
expectations for increases in real estate prices will cause a value loss to the firm by 
increasing potential investment costs for future growth opportunities. Thus, it is 
interesting to notice that real estate decisions influences the firm value through overall 
corporate strategy in Korea (i.e. increases in real estate prices might lead to a decline 
of firms’ willingness to invest) as Nourse and Roulac (1993) showed in their study in 
1993. Cheong and Kim also suggest that the loss of growth opportunity value due to 
expectations of a real estate price increase will be larger for debt-use firms than zero-
debt firms.  
 
Adams and Clarke (1996) extended the research of real estate sale and leasebacks and 
corporate value to the UK market by examining the stock market reaction to 
announcements of sale and leasebacks in the UK. Their results contradicted those 
from the US showing that the share prices of the seller-lessee corporations tended to 
fall on the announcement of a sale and leaseback transaction. They concluded that this 
generally negative reaction may be due to the fact that stock market treats many UK 
sale and leaseback transactions as a signal that the seller-lessee's net operating cash 
flow situation is worse than had previously been thought. 
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Manning and Roulac (1996) aimed at reviewing the tasks a CRE function should 
undertake to create more opportunities for a company’s real estate department to 
increase shareholder wealth. Manning and Roulac (1996) concluded that this could be 
done best by organizing and managing the CRE function centrally, plus training a 
significant proportion of CRE staff to work closely with the operating business units, 
their support staffs and local business unit issues. Further, they indicate that CRE 
staffs need to be continually adding more valuable services customized to increasing 
business unit ROI. In their study refer to five levels of CRE function sophistication 
created by Lambert et al. (1995) and Cameron and Duckworth (1995) based on earlier 
work of Joroff (1992). These levels were  
1. Taskmasters that work for business units to engineer and procure cost-
efficient facilities 
2. Controllers working with upper levels of management to standardize 
employee and operating space needs in order to minimize occupancy 
costs 
3. Dealmakers creatively negotiating on behalf of the overall company to 
seize opportunities to save money through financial, organizational and 
site selection.  
4. Intrapreneurs working with business unit executives as a competitive 
real estate operation in its own right, “benchmarking” their 
performance in terms of both cost and quality of the real estate services 
and products they provide. 
5. Business strategists working with senior corporate and business unit 
managers to integrate workplace, workforce and technological trends 
into a broader strategy that will enhance competitive advantage, 
productivity and shareholder value. 
 
In 1997, Manning et al. tried to explain why firms should consider outsourcing real 
estate management functions and identify both benefits and possible negative 
consequences of outsourcing. This paper was a natural continuation for the Manning 
and Roulac’s previous paper discussing the tasks that CRE function should undertake 
to create shareholder wealth and therefore Manning et al. (1997) use the same 
framework of five levels of CRE function sophistication. They conclude that 
functions associated with “taskmasters”, “controllers” and “deal makers” are more 
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likely to be outsourced successfully whereas “intrepreneurs” and “business strategist” 
management functions are more likely to be carried out more effectively by internal 
managers. They add that outsourcing the appropriate real estate management 
functions, consistent with each company’s individual needs, should enhance 
shareholder wealth. Thus, this conclusion supports the theory that real estate 
ownership could be wise to outsource since seeking good real estate deals and 
managing cost efficiency are tasks to be outsourced. 
 
Golan (1998) studied the own vs. lease decision. Golan (1998) argued that although 
the leasing is in many US corporations the preferred method to acquire real estate due 
to the fact that the corporate performance is in many cases measured with metrics 
such as economic value added (“EVA”) and ROA, each real estate decision should be 
assessed separately against a number of criteria. As Seiler et al. (2001) also Golan 
(1998) noticed that the stock markets do not recognize the specific risk-return profile 
of CRE. Golan (1998) argued that the stock markets might be in practice applying the 
same weighted average cost of capital to the CRE investments as has been used to the 
corporate core business, because stock markets simply do not see real estate as a 
business function itself. If this would be the case it would mean that corporations with 
higher risk profile should not own real estate at all and corporations which weighted 
average cost of capital is lower than what the real estate yield should own the 
properties it uses. Nevertheless, Golan (1998) adds wisely that as a general rule it is 
not good policy to base your long-term financial strategy to the premise that the 
market will remain permanently ignorant. Golan (1998) also argues that leasing is not 
necessarily more flexible solution than ownership, but the flexibility is more linked to 
the liquidity of the property i.e. how easy it is to get rid of the asset by selling or 
leasing it. On the other hand, the liquidity has a lot to do with corporation’s ability to 
create long-term plans and to be proactive. 
 
Carn et al. (1999) studied three major categories of issues that CRE executives will 
face in the future. The study indicated that the CRE executives that took part in the 
survey were strongly aware of and influenced by the many ideas offered in the earlier 
studies. Further, the study found out that the gap between senior management and 
CRE executives and managers of which Arthur Andersen (1993) wrote about is 
narrowing. 
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In 1999, Schaefers studied the factors representing and influencing CRE management 
in Germany. Schaefers (1999) indicated that despite their significant value and 
associated costs, real estate assets are at present seriously undermanaged by vast 
majority of German companies. Neverthless, Schaefers (1999) noticed that in some 
companies the function is evolving into a recognized management activity that 
requires a more formal and systematic approach.  
 
O’Mara (1999) discussed CRE management widely in her book (“Strategy and Place: 
Managing Corporate Real Estate and Facilities for Competitive Advantage”). O’Mara 
indicated among others that when it comes to own vs. lease decision, the right choice 
is not always easy. Even though leasing might seem to be the right solution from the 
opportunity cost of capital point of view, it should be remembered that when it comes 
to CRE, corporation’s needs for the change rapidly. This is especially when it comes 
to properties that are highly specialized and more customized to a particular need 
(requiring extensive technological infrastructure such as manufacturing, data 
processing, research facilities or sometimes headquarters). In these cases long lease 
commitments can hamper a company’s ability to invest in growing/changing its main 
line business and restrictive clauses in leases limit flexibility (O’Mara 1999). 
Therefore, it might be wise to own especially properties which house a highly 
specialized activity that requires large technological investments. On the other hand, 
O’Mara (1999) also wrote that CRE ownership can sometimes be profitable. For 
instance, if a corporation’s presence in some area is going to attract a great deal of 
other corporations (and also real estate developers), it is potentially adding a great 
deal of real estate value to the location (O’Mara, 1999). However, O’Mara (1999) 
adds that in general corporations should concentrate on their core competencies (the 
business sectors in which they can add value the best). As Krumm (1999) indicated, it 
is clear that a corporation cannot forecast real estate market movements as well as a 
professional property market player, which increases risks and decreases the 
probability of success in the property markets.  
 
McDonagh and Hayward (2000) expanded the study concerning CRE asset 
management and outsourcing to New Zealand’s business environment by carrying out 
a survey of 457 organizations. They indicated that as in other countries it seems that 
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also in New Zealand valuations, brokerage and building services are the most usual 
services to be outsourced and on the other hand strategic planning is the most 
common job to be kept in-house. Thus, McDonagh and Hayward (2000) imply that 
there is not that much difference in different developed countries when investigating 
what corporations tend to outsource. McDonagh and Hayward (2000) found out that 
the main difference is actually in how common it is to carry out outsourcing in the 
property industry. An interesting result was also found in the reasons for outsourcing. 
McDonagh and Hayward (2000) showed that there was a significant difference 
between the reasons for outsourcing among those with a large freehold portfolio and 
those with a large leasehold portfolio. The former most often quoted the reason “to 
provide greater flexibility in staff resources” whereas the latter were aiming to 
“reduce the cost of real estate services”. It was also noticed that when a corporation 
has a large freehold portfolio, it usually tends to keep more functions in-house.  
 
Further, McDonagh and Hayward (2000) noticed that those organizations that prefer 
leasing may do so because of the need for flexibility in their business. On the other 
hand, it could also be that the capital and infrequent nature of freehold portfolio 
property purchases mean that management does not see this cost clearly and as readily 
controllable on an ongoing basis. Therefore, lease payments and related costs are 
likely to be constantly on the management agenda for an organization meaning that 
they are much easier to control.  
 
In 2000, Gibson (2000) wrote that CRE managers could gain more insight into the 
problem of how to manage real estate by recognizing that real estate should be 
considered from several perspectives: as a physical, functional and financial asset. 
Each of these perspectives leads to different source of flexibility, which can all help 
corporation to improve its “bottom line” figures. Gibson (2000) suggested that a CRE 
portfolio should be divided into at least three sub-portfolios to be able to maximize 
the flexibility from all angles. These portfolios would be so called core and 
peripherical portfolios determined based on the time span of the properties whether 
the properties are needed for long-term or short-term. The concept of core and 
peripherical labour has been used before in human resource management. However, it 
might be very difficult to determine which properties are core and which are not, 
because of the difficulty to predict future business environment. Gibson’s (2000) 
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property portfolio division could be one way to answer to the flexibility issues that 
have been raised by researchers (e.g. O’Mara, 1999). 
 
In its paper (“Corporate Property is Integral to Corporate Business Strategy”) Roulac 
(2001) aimed to illustrate the positive outcomes that can be realized from strategic 
property management. According to Roulac (2001), there are seven distinct ways how 
CRE can bring competitive advantage to a corporation. These are by creating and 
retaining customers, attracting and retaining outstanding people, contributing to 
effective business processes, promoting enterprise values and culture, stimulating 
innovation and learning, impacting core competency and enhancing shareholder 
wealth. Thus, as Gibson (2000) also Roulac (2001) emphasizes that CRE is a multi-
dimensional asset that can add to corporate profitability and shareholder value in 
many ways. 
 
In 2001, Laposa and Charlton (2001) extended the CRE research by calculating 
standard benchmarks based on accounting and balance sheet information as of 1999, 
and then tested the data for significant differences by two-digit standard industrial 
classification levels between European and US firms. They followed the method of 
Johnson and Keasler (1993) and compared the property, plant and equipment book 
values to a variety of non-property balance sheet and market value figures. Further, 
they extended the previous research through a comparative analysis of 1,573 US firms 
to 2,182 European firms. Laposa and Charlton (2001) suggested that there are 
significant differences between Europe and the USA, dependent on the specific 
benchmark and industrial sector. They explained this by saying that long-term 
European firms have always owned property and are resistant to leasing or selling 
corporate-owned property, that the European corporate property outsourcing firms 
have not yet developed the industry recognition in the non-property world and that 
European firms are reluctant to dispose of undervalued property through alternative 
financial vehicles as sale and leasebacks because of the lack of an established capital 
market. 
 
Pottinger et al. (2001) were one of the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
real estate outsourcing methods at that time. Pottinger et al. (2001) discussed the CRE 
divestment structures and the risks, drivers and barriers associated with the structures 
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and outsourcings in the paper which was published in the journal called “Property 
Management”. It seems that researchers have started to study the more sophisticated 
real estate portfolio sale and leaseback outsourcing) structures only in 21st century. 
One reason for the researchers not to discuss the total outsourcing and real estate 
portfolio sale and leasebacks earlier is obviously that the first transactions of this size 
and complexity was carried out in Europe only in the late 1990s. Pottinger et al. 
concluded firstly that companies already experienced in other areas of outsourcing 
recognize the need to retain adequate in-house expertise. However, the advent of total 
property outsourcing represents an opportunity for in-house property teams to work 
more closely with operational business units. It is clear that to be successful in real 
estate outsourcing and sale and leasebacks, the occupiers need to be intelligent clients, 
which means that they should know a lot about their own business before successful 
outsourcing transactions can be initiated. 
 
Seiler et al. (2001), on the other hand, attempted to ascertain the effect of corporate 
real asset ownership on the systematic risk (beta) and risk-adjusted return to the 
shareholders. Seiler et al. used a sample of 80 firms from 1985-1994 and found no 
evidence in support of a diversification benefit due to holding real assets at the 
corporate level. Therefore, Seiler et al (2001) was able to prove that stock markets do 
not recognize the CRE’s different risk-profile from the corporate core business, but 
see it more as a necessary evil which is needed to be able to create products and 
services. Seiler’s (2001) explain why corporations have been able to obtain abnormal 
gains by divesting CRE and allocating the capital tied in CRE into the corporate core 
business, which usually yields more. 
 
As Gibson (2000), also Woollam (2003) divided corporate properties into three main 
categories in his article published in Journal of Corporate Real Estate. These 
categories were core, tactical and surplus and their ownership should be organized 
differently to be able to get maximum amount of flexibility into the CRE portfolio. 
Woollam (2003) provides also interesting information about the development of CRE 
management and the thrive for flexibility in the real estate portfolios. Woollam (2003) 
among other cites IPD, which has gathered information about the average length of 
leases in the UK. According to IPD, the average length of leases has decreased from 
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15-20 years to 10-13 years during 1992-2002. This illustrates how corporations have 
started to seek for flexibility in the fast changing modern business world. 
 
Redman et al. (2002) analyzed the financing methods used by corporations to acquire 
CRE in the USA. It was found that companies rely on internal financing (operating 
cash-flows) and external financing such as long-term leasing, joint-ventures, property 
mortgages and sale and leasebacks when they carry out real estate acquisitions. 
Managers tend to look at tax advantages of debt and availability of cash-flows in 
deciding which financing methods to use, rather than theoretical corporate finance 
factors. Nevertheless, many of the external financing sources that were ranked 
“traditional” by Redman et al., have not been that traditional in Europe. For instance, 
joint ventures and sophisticated sale and leasebacks have only started to increase their 
popularity during the past 5-10 years in Europe. This also illustrates well the 
difference in the development phases of the European and North-American real estate 
sectors. 
 
Asson (2002) offered a new solution for corporations interested in sale and leasebacks 
in his article (“Real Estate Partnerships: A New Approach to Corporate Real Estate 
Outsourcing”). Motivated by a couple of major outsourcing transactions in the UK, 
Asson (2002) claimed that what a real estate partnership does is take the germ of a 
good idea of sale and leaseback and take it to a more refined and sophisticated level. 
It is a solution driven not by the real estate market, but by a corporate’s present and 
future needs. Nevertheless, the major problem in creating sophisticated outsourcing 
packages is that it is extremely difficult for corporations to predict future and on the 
other hand a flexible outsourcing package can be very expensive. Therefore, it can be 
fully efficient only in more stable businesses. 
 
Brant Bryan (2003) aimed to help the senior CRE decision makers to identify 
opportunities for different types of lease finance in his research paper. According to 
Brant Bryan (2003), in the past, real estate SLBs were often seen as a capital source of 
last resort and SLBs were usually made by distressed companies. Nevertheless, Brant 
Bryan (2003) added that the cost of sale and leaseback financing has decreased lately 
quite significantly as the amount capital available for sale and leaseback transactions 
has increased rapidly. In addition, the sale and leaseback lessors have turned to 
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structured finance solutions to respond creatively to corporate economic needs and 
have produced substantial cost reductions. According to Brant Bryan (2003), this 
continued creativity in real estate finance has provided more efficient, transparent and 
competitive financial structures for corporations, which has lead to a increased 
competitiveness for the lessee corporations. Brant Bryan (2003) discusses the issue 
from the American angle. In Europe, the development of structured real estate finance 
products is ongoing, but perhaps not as far as in Europe. 
 
The most recent study on CRE sale and leasebacks and shareholder wealth in the US 
was conducted by Fisher (2004). By using a sample of 71 sale and leaseback events 
from the 1990s, Fisher documented a significant mean abnormal return of 1.3 % for 
shareholders of seller-lessee firms announcing relatively short leasebacks. The 
evidence shows that also after the 1986 tax reform the US corporations have obtained 
abnormal stock market gains through sale and leasebacks. 
 
In 2006, Liow and Tay studied CRE management in Singapore. Ninety-seven firms 
were surveyed on three main business management perspectives: CRE planning, CRE 
organizational structure and CRE performance. Liow and Tay found out that CRE is 
generally under-managed also in Singapore. In addition, Liow and Tay showed that 
only the CRE planning and the existence of CRE unit have direct impact on CRE 
performance. The results of Liow and Tay support the findings of many of the 
previous studies. Further, according to Liow and Tay, the results support the current 
literature postulations on the importance of strategic planning as the key skills that 
CRE managers need to be equipped with to meet the challenges ahead. 
 
2.2  CRE asset management and own vs. lease discussion based on previous 
studies 
From 1983 American corporate managers have known that it is important not to 
neglect firm’s real estate assets, because neglecting CRE leaves them open to 
takeovers, lost profits and lower stock price performance. The first studies of this 
topic was made in Europe only in the late 1990s. For instance, in 1999 Schaefers 1999 
showed that Europe has been somewhat behind the USA in CRE asset management.  
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After the first studies of CRE asset management a lot of development has happened in 
the field of CRE among the US corporations. For instance, in 1989 Pittman and 
Parker showed that a senior reporting level is a significant factor in determining how 
well CRE department performed. In 1993 Arthur Andersen indicated that the gap 
between the senior executives and CRE managers was still existing, but already in 
1999 Carn et al. noticed that this gap had started to narrow. 
 
On the other hand, it seems that the writings of e.g. Gale and Case (1989), Rutherford 
and Stone (1989), Miles et al. (1989) and Nourse (1988) about how CRE unit should 
be turned from a cost unit into a profit unit have led to that corporations have started 
to separate their real estate operations from other business functions and put more 
emphasis on how the real estate operations are run. One method of doing this has 
obviously been sale and leasebacks and outsourcings.  
 
There are, of course, also other reasons for the increase in real estate divestments and 
decrease in real estate to total assets ratios in the US and in Europe. For instance, 
McDonagh and Hayward (2000) noticed that those organizations that prefer leasing 
may do so because of the need for flexibility in their business and because lease 
payments and related costs are likely to be constantly on the management agenda for 
an organization meaning that they are much easier to control. Also Nourse (1994) 
noticed that it is often easier for corporations to monitor what they actually pay and 
what kind of service they get if they buy it from outside. Further, Nourse (1994) 
suggested that corporations that lease have often tighter linkage between the corporate 
strategy and CRE strategy. Thus, coming back to the Arthur Andersen’s (1993), 
Pittman and Parker’s (1989) and Carn’s (1999) notions, it seems that as leasing has 
become more usual in CRE departments in the USA at the same time the CRE 
strategies have started to have closer ties with the overall corporate strategy. This is 
supported by Johnson and Keasler who already in 1993 showed evidence that the 
share of CRE assets of total corporate assets had started to decrease. 
 
Even though as Laposa and Charlton (2001) suggested that European firms are 
resistant to leasing or selling corporate-owned property, the European firms have 
clearly started to move towards real estate outsourcing (e.g. Pottinger et al. 2001). The 
change in CRE practices has been much faster in Europe than it was in the USA as the 
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European corporations have performed huge real estate sale and leasebacks during the 
past ten years or so. It is obvious that one reason for the fast development is the rapid 
decrease in the price of sale and leaseback financing which Brant Bryan (2003) refers 
to. The reason for this has been mainly the fast increase in the amount of capital 
available for sale and leaseback transactions, which has decreased investors’ yield 
expectations rapidly. Further, the variety of different kinds of flexible sale and 
leaseback solutions has increased fast also in Europe during the past five years and 
today a corporate lessee has a significant amount of fairly prices solutions available 
when he starts to consider real estate outsourcings (e.g. Asson (2002), Pottinger 
(2001)).  
 
3. SUMMARIES OF THE RESEARCH PAPERS 
3.1  Competitive advantage from corporate real estate disposals 
The paper discussed the main advantages and disadvantages of operational CRE 
disposals and outsourcings on the basis of the findings in previous scientific literature 
and studies. The paper reviewed a large amount of research related to CRE 
management and finance. It also described the main techniques and ways to carry out 
operational CRE disposals and outsourcings. In addition, it presented some new 
evidence concerning the increased activity in the European real estate SLB market. 
The study answered the following questions. What are the main advantages and 
disadvantages of operational CRE disposals and outsourcings? What are the most 
common ways and techniques available to carry out these disposals and outsourcings?  
 
In modern shareholder value based corporate governance culture the markets tend to 
understand the value enhancement as maximizing company’s asset base by focusing 
on the corporation’s core competencies, which are usually the areas where the 
corporations can create the largest added value. Even though there is evidence that 
stock markets appreciate operational CRE disposals, nearly 50% of the value of the 
real estate SLBs during 1998-2003 has been carried out by corporations under serious 
financial distress. Other corporate sectors amongst this trend are hotel operators, 
retailers and other corporations with large freehold real estate base. Current and 
former governmental corporations form around 2/3 of the corporations.  
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The study found evidence that by restructuring CRE holdings and asset management, 
corporations can cut costs, decrease risks related to CRE functions and increase 
revenue stream by creating better support to the core business. Researchers have 
shown a number of times that CRE holdings are often under managed and 
corporations that have looked at rationalizing their real estate portfolio outperform 
corporations with large freehold real estate asset bases. However, the rationalizing can 
be done in many ways and only a few corporations have decided to leave the real 
estate sector entirely. 
 
It is known that CRE often needs multiple strategies because of the multiple factors 
concerning products and markets that need to be supported. Therefore, it is clear that 
the optimal technique to finance CRE differs between asset types and uses. In 
addition, corporation’s own distinctive features and the overall market situation have 
a significant influence on what financing techniques a corporation should use.  
 
It is important to decide clearly which property related risks a corporation can 
efficiently bear. If the corporation transfers risks that it could handle better than 
service providers, it pays for nothing. Furthermore, when rushed, CRE disposals can 
create more problems than they solve. For example, long lease agreements on wrong 
properties could create inflexibility. In addition, as in Modigliani and Miller’s theories 
of agency problems between shareholders and corporate management, problems could 
arise with service subscribers and providers (Louko 2004a). It is also important to 
remember that the rules for off-balance sheet financing are changing rapidly and 
therefore obtaining off-balance sheet finance cannot be the main reason for real estate 
sell-offs.   
 
When done correctly disposals of operational CRE can be a useful method in the 
process of unlocking inefficiencies and creating strategic advantages. It is usually not 
only possible to cut costs and improve key performance ratios with disposals, but 
disposals can also be an efficient way to finance corporate activities without 
increasing leverage levels. By outsourcing CRE and related services to a professional 
service provider, the corporation can also get an access to property industry 
knowledge that it would not otherwise get. In addition, a professional property 
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manager can often provide services more efficiently than an in-house organization, 
which can make outsourcing more cost effective than is commonly believed.   
 
3.2  Corporate real estate disposal impact on corporate performance ratios 
The study investigated if large operational CRE disposals carried out between the 
years 1998-2001 in Europe had a positive impact on the seller corporations’ 
performance ratios. In addition, the study focused on finding out whether the 
performance ratios of retail and telecom corporations, which carried out major 
operational CRE disposals between the years 1999-2002, were significantly worse 
before the transactions than the performance ratios of other corporations at the same 
business sector. This research paper answered the following questions. What kind of 
impact did the large operational CRE disposals have on the corporate performance 
ratios in general? Did the corporations in the retail and telecom sectors perform 
significantly worse before the operational CRE disposals than the industry 
benchmark? 
 
3.2.1 Results and statistical testing (not included in the original paper)  
There was some evidence that the retail corporations that have been disposing 
operational CRE were less profitable as opposed to other corporations in the same 
business sector before the transactions. Also the results of paired t-test illustrated in 
the Table 1 support this assumption. The mean of the differences from the benchmark 
of the before transaction two-year average return on assets (ROA) of the sample retail 
corporations is statistically different from zero even at 1% significance level. Also the 
mean of the differences of the after transaction two-year average turnover growth 
(TG) figures is statistically different from zero at 1% significance level, which on the 
other hand indicates on some level that the sample corporations have not allocated the 
money obtained from the transactions to corporate growth immediately after the 
transaction. 
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Table 1: Sample corporations' average performance ratios 2-years before and after the disposal
Corporation Year ROA 
before
ROA 
after
Benchmark 
before1
ER 
before
ER after Benchmark 
before*
CR 
before
CR after Benchmark 
before*
TG 
before
TG after Benchmark 
before*
Kesko 1999 6,7 % 6,4 % 11,2 % 54,4 % 55,9 % 50,4 % 0,92 0,81 1,08 10,4 % 2,6 % 15,3 %
MFI 1999 4,9 % 6,6 % 11,2 % 44,0 % 55,6 % 50,4 % 0,62 0,66 1,08 -1,7 % 5,7 % 15,3 %
Metro 1999 3,0 % 6,6 % 11,2 % 35,1 % 29,8 % 50,4 % 0,90 1,00 1,08 27,4 % 0,3 % 15,3 %
Kesko 2000 8,7 % 3,8 % 10,4 % 56,2 % 54,2 % 48,5 % 0,90 0,72 1,02 2,0 % 0,9 % 14,5 %
Marks&Spencer 2001 9,2 % 9,8 % 8,9 % 58,8 % 43,9 % 47,4 % 0,98 1,12 0,96 -0,9 % 0,0 % 15,7 %
Somerfield 2001 -3,0 % 1,7 % 8,9 % 44,2 % 49,4 % 47,4 % 1,02 0,74 0,96 -11,5 % 0,6 % 15,7 %
Sainsbury 2000 7,0 % 6,6 % 10,4 % 46,1 % 45,3 % 48,5 % 0,77 0,82 1,02 6,0 % 2,3 % 14,5 %
Carrefour 2001 6,7 % 6,9 % 8,9 % 25,1 % 24,1 % 47,4 % 0,90 1,34 0,96 54,9 % 3,1 % 15,7 %
Carrefour 2002 6,7 % 7,8 % 8,0 % 25,0 % 24,2 % 47,2 % 1,62 0,83 0,97 16,0 % 0,8 % 14,1 %
Somerfield 2002 0,8 % 2,0 % 8,0 % 48,3 % 49,7 % 47,2 % 0,84 0,75 0,97 -7,5 % -1,3 % 14,1 %
Average 5,1 % 5,8 % 9,7 % 43,7 % 43,2 % 48,5 % 0,95 0,88 1,01 9,5 % 1,5 % 15,0 %
Median 6,7 % 6,6 % 9,6 % 45,2 % 47,4 % 48,0 % 0,90 0,82 0,99 4,0 % 0,8 % 15,3 %
p-value (paired t-test) 0,00    0,00    0,12    0,10    0,26    0,06    0,20    0,00    
1 Average performance of the benchmark group during 2-years before the disposal
ROA= Return on assets, ER=Equity ratio, CR=Current ratio, TG=Turnover growth  
 
On the other hand, the telecom corporations that have been performing real estate sell-
offs had generally worse short-term solvency than the corporations in the same 
business sector before the transactions as shown in the Table 2. The mean of the 
differences from the benchmark of the before transaction two-year average current 
ratios of the sample telecom corporations is statistically different from zero even at 
1% significance level. Further, as in the case of the retail corporations, also the mean 
of the differences of the after transaction two-year average turnover growth (TG) 
figures of the telecom corporations was statistically different from zero at 1% 
significance level, which indicates that the sample corporations have not allocated the 
money obtained from the transactions to corporate growth immediately after the 
transaction. In addition, the equity ratios of the sample corporations were in all the 
other cases except for Deutsche Telecom worse than benchmark, but because of the 
DT’s exception, the differences were statistically significant only at 10% significance 
level. 
 
Table 2: Sample corporations' average performance ratios 2-years before and after the disposal
Corporation Year ROA 
before
ROA 
after
Benchmark 
before1
ER 
before
ER after Benchmark 
before1
CR 
before
CR after Benchmark 
before1
TG 
before
TG after Benchmark 
before1
Telecom Italia 2000 12,4 % 11,3 % 10,5 % 44,8 % 38,3 % 45,0 % 0,73 0,68 0,88 8,2 % 6,6 % 15,3 %
BT 2001 8,0 % 8,5 % 8,4 % 23,0 % 4,7 % 42,2 % 0,49 0,62 0,90 27,8 % -17,5 % 16,6 %
FT 2001 6,7 % 4,9 % 8,4 % 31,5 % 11,4 % 42,2 % 0,55 0,48 0,90 25,7 % 6,6 % 16,6 %
DT 2001 8,6 % 5,9 % 8,4 % 47,6 % 43,1 % 42,2 % 0,62 0,39 0,90 -3,7 % -4,3 % 16,6 %
SwissCom 2001 10,8 % 16,0 % 8,4 % 35,7 % 50,3 % 42,2 % 0,76 0,39 0,90 16,7 % 2,1 % 16,6 %
Telecom Italia 2002 11,3 % 10,5 % 2,7 % 38,3 % 26,2 % 40,4 % 0,68 0,82 0,84 6,6 % 0,1 % 15,0 %
Average 9,6 % 9,5 % 7,8 % 36,8 % 29,0 % 42,4 % 0,64 0,56 0,88 13,6 % -1,1 % 16,1 %
Median 9,7 % 9,5 % 8,4 % 37,0 % 32,3 % 42,2 % 0,65 0,55 0,90 12,5 % 1,1 % 16,6 %
p-value (paired t-test) 0,14    0,21    0,09    0,06    0,00    0,01    0,31    0,00    
1 Average performance of the benchmark group during 2-years before the disposal
ROA= Return on assets, ER=Equity ratio, CR=Current ratio, TG=Turnover growth  
 
All the corporations that sold over 10% of their total assets in CRE disposals between 
the years 1998-2001 were able to improve their profitability in terms of return on 
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assets. Most of them also improved their capital structure and short-term solvency, 
even though the business cycle at the same time was not very good. In addition, 
approximately half of the total 20 corporations under investigation were able to 
improve their profitability, capital structure or short-term solvency despite the slump 
in the world economy. The effect on performance ratios was clearest in the retail 
sector, where seven out of the total ten studied corporations were able to improve 
average return on total assets, when at the same time only 30% of the other 
corporations were able to do this. Similarly, seven out of the total ten retail 
corporations increased their dividend payments after the real estate sell-offs, when at 
the same time only one corporation from all other business sectors managed to do 
this. 
 
Nevertheless, the improvement in the performance of the corporations was rather 
rarely statistically significant as paired t-test results below show (Table 3). For 
instance, the mean of the differences of the two-year averages of the before and after 
transactions ROA of the retail corporations was statistically significant only at 10% 
significance level. Also it seems that there is a difference between the before and after 
transaction growths of the corporations. However, this growth has been negative, 
perhaps due to the small recession in the beginning of this century. 
 
Table 3: p-values (Paired t-test)
Sample 
size
ROA Equity CR Divident Growth
Retail sector 12 0,09 0,44 0,25 0,16 0,11
Telecom sector 6 0,47 0,09 0,22 0,11 0,04
Other corporations 5 0,10 0,28 0,07 0,09 0,37
Total 23 0,47 0,11 0,10 0,11 0,03  
 
The entire sample of the sample corporations before and after transaction performance 
ratios is shown in the table 4. 
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Table 4: The real estate disposal effect on corporate performance ratios
Corporation Year Deal value, 
m€
ROA 
before1
ROA 
after1
Equity 
before2
Equity 
after2
CR 
before3
CR after3 Dividend 
before4
Dividend 
after4
Growth 
before5
Growth 
after5
Kesko 1998 200 3,8% 8,7% 52,6% 56,2% 0,93 0,90 0,42 0,59 9,6% 2,0%
Kesko 1999 94 6,7% 6,4% 54,4% 55,9% 0,92 0,81 0,59 0,75 10,4% 2,6%
MFI 1999 154 4,9% 6,6% 44,0% 55,6% 0,62 0,66 0,04 0,02 -1,7% 5,7%
Metro 1999 2700 3,0% 6,6% 35,1% 29,8% 0,90 1,00 1,53 1,02 61,3% 0,3%
WH Smith 1999 57 10,1% 11,5% 62,7% 67,4% 0,96 0,95 0,23 0,27 -0,2% -3,5%
Kesko 2000 67 8,7% 3,8% 56,2% 54,2% 0,90 0,72 0,59 0,80 2,0% 0,9%
Marks & Spencer 2001 580 9,2% 9,8% 58,8% 43,9% 0,98 1,12 0,06 0,06 -0,9% 0,0%
Somerfield 2001 40 -3,0% 3,4% 44,2% 49,4% 1,02 0,74 0,01 0,19 -11,5% 0,6%
Sainsbury 2000 809 7,0% 5,5% 46,1% 45,3% 0,77 0,82 0,20 0,21 6,0% 2,3%
Carrefour 2001 1940 6,7% 6,9% 25,1% 24,1% 0,90 1,34 0,48 0,60 14,9% 3,1%
Carrefour 2002 104 6,7% 7,8% 25,0% 24,2% 1,62 0,83 0,53 0,69 16,0% 0,8%
Somerfield 2002 30 0,8% 2,0% 48,3% 49,7% 0,84 0,75 0,07 0,28 -7,5% -1,3%
Telecom Italia 2000 2900 12,4% 11,3% 44,8% 38,3% 0,73 0,68 0,23 0,31 8,2% 6,6%
British Telecom 2001 3800 8,0% 8,5% 23,0% 4,7% 0,49 0,62 0,10 0,03 27,8% -17,5%
France Telecom 2001 3300 6,7% 4,9% 31,5% 11,4% 0,55 0,48 1,00 0,50 25,7% 6,6%
Sireo / DT 2001 1100 8,6% 5,9% 47,6% 43,1% 0,62 0,39 0,62 0,19 -3,7% -4,3%
SwissCom 2001 1636 10,8% 16,0% 35,7% 50,3% 0,76 1,64 8,39 5,16 16,7% 2,1%
Telecom Italia 2002 2900 11,3% 10,5% 38,3% 26,2% 0,68 0,82 0,32 0,22 6,6% 0,1%
Thalès 2001 467 3,4% 2,5% 22,3% 19,8% 1,08 2,66 0,60 0,35 18,1% 13,9%
Ericsson 2000 404 10,2% 1,2% 35,8% 32,0% 1,36 2,08 0,04 0,02 13,4% 5,9%
Thomson Multimedia 2000 91 6,4% 8,2% 52,3% 53,8% 0,88 1,84 0,00 0,00 7,5% 25,7%
SAS 2001 334 5,3% -0,2% 43,6% 32,4% 0,95 0,86 0,47 0,00 55,2% -6,4%
The Hilton Group 2001 448 8,3% 7,0% 21,6% 28,2% 1,26 1,10 0,07 0,07 -8,1% 18,5%
1 Average return on total assets for a two-year period before and after the disposal.
2 Average equity ratio for a two-year period before and after the disposal.
3 Average current ratio for a two-year period before and after the disposal.
4 Average divident per share for a two-year period before and after the disposal.
5 Average turnover growth for a two-year period before and after the disposal. Metro's and Telecom Italia's TG before includes only one year before the deal.
5 For Metro and Telecom Italia (2000) only one year has been taken into account before the deal.  
 
3.3  Four cases of corporate real estate disposals 
The first objective of this study was to find out more about the true reasons for the 
CRE outsourcings that many European corporations have been carrying out roughly 
from the beginning of this decade. The second goal was to study how these 
corporations have reached their goals and what kinds of difficulties occurred in these 
outsourcings. The study found answers to the following questions:  
1) Why did the case-study corporations carry out large-scale CRE outsourcings and 
how did the corporations reach their goals?  
2) How did the outsourcing methods and processes differ between the corporations 
studied? 
 
Representatives of all of the case-corporations were interviewed for the study. In 
addition, several other experts involved either as investors or advisors in the 
transactions were interviewed for the study. Based on the interviews, the main reason 
for executing the CRE outsourcings was the immediate cash payout. In addition, the 
corporations generally aimed at increasing their capital and space-use efficiency as 
 40
well as occupational flexibility. Real estate was considered, in many ways, as an 
under-performing asset on the corporate balance sheet.  
 
The study showed well that leases of wrong length or wrong amount of flexibility 
could become extremely expensive. As we know, an investor will give a price for 
every risk it identifies before executing a deal, which means that the tenant can be 
successful in leasing only if it can predict its future occupational needs well when 
structuring the transaction. However, it might well be that sometimes the benefits 
from redirecting the capital tied in the real estate to the corporate core business and 
transferring real estate related risks to service providers could justify the flexibility 
problems caused by the disposals. After all, the stock markets do often appreciate 
property outsourcings. 
  
It could be suggested that corporations should not make too detailed and long-term 
planning when making decisions about lease lengths and flexibility. It could be more 
appropriate to try either to structure break options to rental agreements or to sign 
shorter leases. Flexibility is always expensive and if it is not needed, the corporation 
pays for nothing. In addition, it was noticed that corporations should aim at disposing 
their real estate holdings when the corporation is performing well (during booms), 
because this way they can usually get better deal terms. During booms real estate 
prices are normally high, corporation’s credibility as a tenant usually good and the 
properties that are sold are usually occupied. These factors together lead to the best 
possible deal terms. 
 
3.4  Corporate real estate ownership and the market for sale and 
leasebacks in Finland 
The aim of this study was to gather new information on CRE ownership and the 
market for real estate SLBs in Finland. The property ownership and related ratios of 
the corporations listed in the HEX main list were investigated and compared with the 
respective figures in other countries. In addition, the development of the Finnish SLB 
market during the past few years was illustrated by calculating the volume of the 
market between the years 2000-2003 and by gathering an indicative list of major 
SLBs in Finland during these past four years. Further, the real estate ownership and 
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related ratios were calculated for the years 2000 and 2003, in order to see if there has 
been a decline in the ratios. 
  
This study found out that the real estate ownership ratios are, on average, somewhat 
lower in Finland than in the UK and in Western Europe. Explanations for this might 
be, for instance, lower land prices in Finnish cities compared with major European 
hubs, as well as traditionally flexible short-term rental agreements in Finland. 
However, in the US these ratios seem to be lower than in our Finnish sample. The real 
estate assets to total assets ratios and owner-occupation ratios in major European 
countries are currently at about the same level of what these figures were in the US 
about a decade ago. Thus, we can assume that the current trend of decreasing 
corporate property ownership will continue in Europe in the future. 
  
The sample of the HEX-30 corporations showed a clear decrease in the real estate 
assets to total assets ratios during the past three years. Also, the total real estate 
ownership at book values in the HEX decreased significantly during this period, even 
though at the same time the amount of total assets among the corporations grew a 
great deal. This notion is inline, for instance, with the previous findings of Seiler et al. 
(2001) and Brounen & Eichholtz (2003) who indicated that CRE ownership appears 
to be decreasing over time. The volume of SLBs in Finland increased somewhat in 
2002-2003. It seems that there has been a constant flow of SLBs in Finland during 
this century, which is also likely to continue in the future. Additionally, a significant 
increase in the share of foreign investors providing SLB finance on the Finnish 
market has been noticed during the past few years.  
  
It is likely that the corporations getting the most benefits from selling and leasing 
back real estate are the ones with large holdings of investment grade office and retail 
facilities. Further, there are many HEX-listed corporations, of which real estate 
holdings are worth nearly as much, or even more than the whole company. In these 
cases, the corporations should consider releasing these ‘hidden capital reserves’ by 
conducting SLBs. Otherwise the corporation might become a takeover target in the 
future.  
 
 42
3.5  Corporate Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Effect 
Corporate real estate disposals have increased in Europe during the past few years. 
This study examined the market reactions to the corporate real estate sale and 
leaseback announcements made by publicly traded European companies. The 
empirical findings indicate that the impact of announcements of sale and leasebacks 
of major corporate real estate holdings on firm value is on average positive 0.877 % 
after controlling for the market risk. This effect is statically significantly different 
from zero at the 1 % level. This result is in line with the results of Slovin et al. (1990), 
Rutherford (1990) and Fisher (2004). Thus earlier results from the US and the UK can 
be generalized to the pan-European real estate market.  
 
Dividing the sample according to the size of the transaction revealed that the positive 
announcement effect is mostly due to the largest one third of the deals where the deal 
size is measured as the ratio of the deal value to the market capitalization of the firm. 
Over a post-event period of ten days, these companies increased their market value on 
average by 2.494 % whereas companies with small- and mid-sized transactions 
experienced slightly negative development. The event day return for the largest 
transactions was 1.628 % (statistically significantly different from zero). Similar 
positive relationship between transaction size and event day return is observed in 
cross-section regression analysis. 
 
It is widely accepted notion in finance that leasing is substitute for debt. However, 
earlier studies have found out that the price reaction to debt announcements have been 
on average negative. Finding a positive market reaction associated with sale and 
leaseback announcements indicate that sale and leaseback transactions create some 
gains for shareholders over debt. There are several potential sources for the wealth 
creation. A common explanation for such gains is the tax savings created through the 
transaction. Another explanation for such gains is the hidden value hypothesis which 
suggests that the sale and leaseback transaction reveals hidden value locked in 
corporations’ real estate holdings. One can also argue the transaction gives the 
company a possibility to reallocate the capital tied in real estate to higher yielding 
core business, which makes the use of the corporate capital more efficient.  
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Our results do not give support for the tax savings hypothesis. Instead, the hidden 
value hypothesis of Brennan (1990) seems more plausible explanation for the results. 
Namely, the highest positive effect is found for the transactions of the industrial 
properties which are arguably the most difficult to value. Furthermore, the valuation 
effect varies across property types more than one could expect under the tax savings 
hypothesis.  
 
We also observed that the company beta is positively and significantly related to the 
abnormal returns when the relative size of the transaction has been accounted for. We 
argue that this is hard to explain with the tax savings hypothesis. Instead the hidden 
value hypothesis offers an explanation since high beta companies have higher cost of 
capital and as a result their value increase should be larger because of the conversion 
of future cash flows into immediate value. Alternatively, the reaction could be the 
result of due to allocating capital tied in the low yielding real estate assets into the 
high yielding corporate core business. Again high beta companies should experience 
bigger value increases. 
 
We believe that a sale and leaseback transaction should not be interpreted just as a 
simple debt transaction, which is the way many academics still view lease 
agreements. Our results support the argument of Lewis and Schallheim (1992), among 
others, that leasing and debt are more complements that substitutes. Thus, sale and 
leaseback deals could be interpreted as an external financing alternative that is usually 
value increasing, although most of the other external financing decisions have been 
found value decreasing.  
 
Our results have several practical implications. From a firm’s point of view, sale and 
leaseback transactions should usually be preferred over straight debt issues. 
Moreover, companies with substantial real estate holdings should consider of selling 
and leasing back their properties to be able to maximize shareholder value. A sale and 
leaseback can be seen as s a way to spread the information of hidden real estate value 
to the markets. On the other hand, investors who invest their time in analysing 
companies’ real estate holdings have been able to achieve abnormal returns. 
 
 44
4. CONCLUSIONS  AND DISCUSSION 
4.1  The financial point of view  
When the opportunity cost of the capital tied in CRE holdings has been taken into 
account, the ownership of CRE often seems questionable. The value of a corporation 
is usually defined as corporation’s future cash flows discounted at the rate that reflects 
the risks of these cash flows. The most commonly used discount rate is the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC), which should reflect the risks from both the equity 
and debt holders’ point of view. In this case, debt commitments should also include 
leases that have significant importance. On the other hand, the cost of equity should 
be different between two companies with different kinds of asset bases. Therefore, 
both CRE ownership and leases should have their effect on corporate WACC, 
meaning that a corporation that owns its real estate assets should have a different 
discount rate and risk profile from a corporation that leases its facilities. Significant 
long-term lease commitments are often taken into account when corporate values are 
determined, but are real estate assets? If real estate assets are not taken into account, it 
leads to a valuation error that drives corporations with businesses yielding more than 
real estate only to lease properties and corporations with businesses yielding less than 
real estate to own properties. Thus, the valuation error would drive corporations 
towards riskier corporate asset portfolios, meaning also that corporations owning a lot 
of real estate could increase their profitability and create more economic profit simply 
by reallocating the capital tied in real estate into the corporate core business.  
 
Therefore, it should be incorrect to apply same discount rate on corporation’s future 
cash flows before and after a real estate SLB, because it should not be possible, in 
theory, to increase corporate values just by leasing assets instead of owning (Louko 
2004a). Nevertheless, many event-studies have shown that real estate SLBs do create 
abnormal stock market gains for seller corporations (e.g. Grönlund et al. 2005). 
Therefore, could it be that the stock markets are applying the same WACC as 
discount rate for a corporation before and after an SLB? This should be incorrect, 
because corporation’s risk-return profile is likely to change when real estate assets are 
disposed. Of course, this is true only when the amount of real estate disposed is 
significant in comparison with corporation’s market capitalization. 
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Many corporations actually use WACC as cost of capital when evaluating real estate 
investments and therefore accept only real estate projects that yield more than the 
corporate WACC, which of course often leads to favoring leasing instead of owning 
due to the low returns of real estate investments. Thus, we could say that the argument 
that corporations’ lower yielding assets such as real estate should be sold and the 
money invested in better yielding core business is partly false due to the different risk-
profiles of different asset classes. However, it is true that corporations can usually 
create much more economic profit or economic value added in their core businesses 
than in real estate business, which means that it could be wise to direct most of the 
capital into the core business.   
 
But why do the markets not see real estate as an asset that has its effect on corporate 
risk-return profile? The answer might be that CRE is perhaps seen more as an input in 
the production process rather than as a financial asset that diversifies corporate asset 
portfolio and has a significant residual value. Therefore, an SLB is often seen as a 
straightforward way to release the capital tied unnecessarily in the corporation’s 
production process without affecting the corporate risk profile. If a corporation can 
create the same added value by tying less capital, it should do that in order to keep its 
shareholders satisfied. However, it is commonly known that property values usually 
correlate negatively with other asset classes. Therefore, in most cases real estate’s risk 
profile should differ from the corporation’s overall risk profile and have its effect on 
the WACC.  
 
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, in the real world it might well be that the stock markets 
do not fully recognize real estate’s unique risk-return profile, which leads to CRE 
ownership not being appropriate for corporations with a cost of capital higher than 
what real estate assets yield, which very often is the case. This would lead to a 
collective under-valuation of CRE assets by the stock markets. 
 
Another distinctive feature in corporate valuation is that it is often very difficult to 
know the market values of CRE holdings due to depreciations and inflation. The 
historical acquisition prices shown in the corporate balance sheet tell only little about 
the true values of the properties in question. Therefore, even if an analyst wanted to 
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assess the true value of a corporation’s real estate holdings, it would be extremely 
difficult. Thus, it is much easier to consider real estate as an input in the production 
process like corporate equipment for instance, which ends up to that many 
corporations may have significant ’hidden reserves’ in their real estate holdings, 
which could be used to expand the corporation’s core businesses or distributed back 
to the shareholders. Therefore, by outsourcing CRE ownerships, a corporation can 
make its balance sheet more transparent and easier to value from the financial markets 
point of view and usually also release hidden value. 
 
Another simple way to demonstrate why corporations that are not in real estate 
business should not invest in real estate purely from the financial point of view is 
simply to view this kind of action from the shareholders’ point of view. A firm can 
either keep and reinvest its cash or return it back to the shareholders. If cash is 
reinvested, the opportunity cost is, of course, the expected rate of return that 
shareholders could have obtained by investing in financial assets of same risk profile 
(see figure 2). When it comes to real estate investments, corporations’ ability to make 
profit in real estate sector should be compared to a real estate investment trust, for 
instance. This is because the shareholders could take the same amount of real estate 
risk just by buying shares in real estate investment trusts or companies instead of 
investing in real estate through the corporation. It seems clear that a professional 
property investor such as a real estate investment trust would be able to handle the 
real estate related risks and make profits better than an unprofessional real estate 
owner who is furthermore unable to diversify its real estate holdings or to choose the 
best possible investments from the property market. 
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FIRM
Investment 
opportunity 
(Real asset)
Shareholder
Investment 
opportunities 
(financial assets)
Cash
Invest Alternative:
pay dividend
to shareholders
Shareholders
invest for 
themselves  
Figure 2: A firm's capital spending possibilities (Brealey and Myers, 2000) 
 
These features of CRE and corporate valuation explain at least partly why several 
researchers have been able to prove that real estate SLBs and disposal decisions have 
usually a positive impact on shareholder value (see figure 3).  
 
-1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3
Abnormal return (%)
Decision to form a corporate real estate division Decision to lease property
relocation to cut costs relocation resulting from management self-interest
sale of freehold assets sale and leaseback
spin-off of a real estate subsidiary
 
Figure 3: The effect of real estate decisions on corporate value (Rodriguez and Sirmans, 1996 and 
PwC, 2000) 
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Another part of the positive impact on shareholder wealth could perhaps be explained 
by the significant efficiency gains that corporations might be able to obtain through 
outsourcing real estate activities to professional service providers (Louko 2004a and 
Louko 2004b). As this doctoral thesis has shown, there is a large variety of possible 
efficiency gains associated with real estate outsourcings such as  
- the possibility to increase corporate capital-use efficiency and performance 
ratios, 
- the possibility to focus on the core businesses where the corporation can create 
value the best, 
- the possibility to increase occupational flexibility, 
- the possibility to increase space-use efficiency, 
- the possibility to increase real estate asset management efficiency, 
- the possibility to transfer property related risks to experts that can handle them 
better, 
- the possibility to change volatile occupancy costs to fixed payments to 
decrease risks, 
- the possibility to create tax advantages if the investor is able to use the 
depreciation tax-shields more efficiently, 
- the possibility to diversify corporate financing sources and 
- the possibility to release 100% of real estate value (instead of 70-80% with 
mortgage). 
 
In addition, a professional real estate investor has the possibility to diversify its real 
estate portfolio better than the corporation itself ever could, which should be reflected 
as lower occupancy costs to the tenant. Thus, in a way, it would make more sense for 
a corporation to lease the real estate associated with its core business and then to 
invest in a perfectly diversified real estate portfolio rather than to invest in the CRE as 
indicated above. 
 
4.2  Operational and real estate strategic point of view 
It could be asked that if CRE divestments increase corporate share prices and create 
significant efficiency gains, why do so many successful corporations still own real 
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estate? This might well be because a corporation cannot base its lease versus own 
decision only on short-term financial reasons. Usually also the operational and 
strategic aspects should be considered throughout. It is clear that real estate SLBs can 
tie corporations to inflexible and long-term commitments that can become very 
expensive in time if not planned well. Therefore, the benefits from CRE outsourcings 
should be substantial enough not only to allow the investor to gain adequate profit, 
but also to outnumber any potential losses caused by unexpected problems to make 
the outsourcing worthwhile in the long run. In a nutshell, the traditional disadvantages 
of SLBs are  
- the difficulty in choosing the lease length and terms, which often leads to 
flexibility problems, 
- the loss of power in redevelopment and alteration issues of the property, which 
can lead to inflexibility, 
- the loss of potential increases in real estate values, 
- the fact that investor’s yield demand is in some cases clearly higher than 
interest rate levels  and  
- the fact that most of the longer leases and leases that include buy-options will 
be on-balance sheet in the future. 
 
A lease agreement can be a significant long-term commitment that cannot be based on 
inaccurate assumptions of corporation’s future plans. If an SLB creates inflexibility it 
can become extremely costly. A common problem for many corporations carrying out 
SLBs is the difficulty in predicting corporation’s future occupational needs, which 
leads to signing leases of wrong length. Nevertheless, flexibility does not merely 
relate to the occasional need for right-size operations. Studies have shown clearly that 
it relates also to the continuous change of the products and markets that the CRE 
holdings have to support (see Louko 2005a). The production methods and business 
trends affecting CRE changes fast which means that at least properties in production 
use are nowadays under a continuous need for redevelopment. 
 
Corporations’ real estate operations should be able to answer to core businesses’ 
space demand, which means that successful CRE strategies are the ones that are 
aligned with the corporate core business. Simple put, if a corporation uses mainly 
leases instead of ownership, it should be able to match its business needs to the lease 
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lengths and structures. In addition, these leases should not create any additional 
barriers to the expansion or changes in the core business processes. As Figure 4 
shows, aligning CRE strategy to the corporate strategy with leasing can often be very 
difficult. The Figure 4 shows the results of a survey conducted in the UK, which 
demonstrated that the UK lease lengths usually vary between 5-15 years while 
occupiers’ business outlook ranges from less than one year to the maximum of five 
years. While five years is a minimum in lease terms, it can be a lifetime in business 
planning. Therefore, despite the many advantages leasing arrangements can provide, 
many successful corporations still prefer ownership when it comes to properties, 
which outsourcing could cause inflexibility.  
 
15 years
10 years 
5 years 
2 years 
5 years 
1 year 
less
Occupier’s business outlook
Investors’ longevity of income
Core HQ Functions (Finance, HR, IT, Marketing)
Non-Core (Sales, Consultancy, Projects)
Non-Core (Contracts, Projects)
Non-Core (Contracts, Projects, Touchdown)  
Figure 4: Property is often not aligned with the core business (Woollam 2003) 
 
Owned property may actually sometimes provide a competitive advantage. This is 
usually when the corporation’s needs for the properties change. Especially when it 
comes to properties that are highly specialized and more customized to a particular 
need (requiring extensive technological infrastructure such as manufacturing, data 
processing, research facilities or sometimes headquarters) unwieldy real estate 
commitments can hamper a company’s ability to invest in growing/changing its main 
line business as O’Mara (1999) said. Restrictive clauses in leases might limit 
flexibility and can make it more difficult to expand businesses at will. This is why the 
properties many corporations own are often the ones which house a highly specialized 
activity that requires large technological investments.  
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As already discussed earlier O’Mara (1999) listed other downsides of leasing such as 
expensive lease payments when compared to the interest rate levels and the loss of 
possible capital gains. This has, however, changed somewhat lately. Due to falling 
yield levels across Europe, property investors are today requiring much smaller initial 
yields for their investments than a few years ago (e.g. Brant Bryan 2003). 
Nevertheless, it is definitely true that CRE ownership can also sometimes be very 
profitable. For instance, if a corporation’s presence in some area is going to attract a 
great deal of other corporations (and also real estate developers), it is potentially 
adding a great deal of real estate value to the location. Under these circumstances it 
would perhaps make sense to own the property so that the company can benefit from 
the potential appreciation. However, corporations should be careful not to be seduced 
into making real estate decisions which may be profitable in the short term but lead to 
poor logistics or impaired operations for the core business in the long term as O’Mara 
(1999) put it. In general, corporations should concentrate on their core competencies 
(the business sectors in which they can add value the best). Profits from the real estate 
markets are appropriate to see just as a welcomed by-product of the core businesses, 
not the ultimate goal of the company. It is clear that a corporation cannot forecast real 
estate market movements as well as a professional property market player, which 
increases its risks.  
 
4.3  When to carry out CRE disposals and outsourcings? 
If one major question is which properties a corporation should outsource, another 
important question is when this outsourcing should be conducted. Several empirical 
studies have discussed this question (see e.g. Chapter 2.1 or Louko 2005a). In the 
past, real estate SLBs were often seen as a capital source of last resort and SLBs were 
usually made by distressed companies. This seems still to be the case in many 
occasions. During the so far largest real estate outsourcings boom between 1998-
2003, over 1/3 of the value of large SLB transactions was carried out by corporations 
in the IT / telecommunications sector. These corporations were usually wrestling with 
huge amounts of debt at the time of the real estate disposal (Louko 2004a).  
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Many studies that have discussed CRE ownership issues have shown that divesting 
CRE in financial distress is seldom a good option, although it sometimes might be the 
only option for a cash-trapped corporation (Louko 2005a). This is because the 
corporation will usually suffer at least a triple penalty when divesting CRE in 
financial distress. Firstly, corporations are in financial distress usually during a 
recession when property prices are not the highest possible. Secondly, during 
financial distress a corporation’s credibility as a tenant and its negotiating power are 
worse than normal. Thirdly, when a corporation is in financial distress, it has usually 
already begun to downsize its operations, which means that it has a lot of vacant space 
of which investors will not pay the maximum price. 
 
Therefore, as stated in the paper (3) of the thesis (Louko 2005a), the best real estate 
disposals are always made during booms, not during busts. During booms, a 
corporation’s credibility is high, which means better lease terms and lower rental 
payments. Similarly, during booms also the property prices are usually high. 
Unfortunately, corporations have rather rarely been able to divest real estate at good 
times. Many times in the past we have heard stories of corporations making SLBs 
during financial distress with terrible terms. In these situations, the CRE disposals are 
not usually well planned, because the divestments do not initiate from the corporate 
long-term strategy, but from a short-term need for cash. 
 
However, unfortunately, the fact usually is that companies build and buy real estate 
when their business growth requires it, not when there is a good investment market, 
meaning that they usually make property commitments in a growing economy when 
the prices are high. On the other hand, it is similarly clear that companies typically 
sell real estate when they no longer have a business use for the property. Thus, 
corporations’ real estate strategies have traditionally been more reactive than 
proactive, which has in many cases lead to very difficult situations. By aligning CRE 
strategies with the core businesses, it is possible for corporations to proactively 
manage their real estate holdings, which should lead to increased profitability by 
decreasing real estate related costs.  
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4.4  ‘Perfect solution’ 
As stated in the first research paper, it is clear that CRE often needs multiple 
strategies because of the multiple factors concerning products and markets that need 
to be supported. Therefore, it is clear that the optimal technique to finance CRE 
differs between asset types and uses. In addition, a corporation’s own distinctive 
features and the overall market situation have a significant influence on what 
financing techniques it should use.  
 
A perfect overall CRE financing solution may be impossible find. Nevertheless, as a 
guideline, it could be said that based on the principles of shareholder value 
management, a corporation should not own any real estate assets if it can produce 
higher yield to its shareholders with the same overall risk-level without them. On the 
other hand, if owning some properties makes the corporation less risky and makes it 
possible for the corporation to have a much higher income stream in the future, 
ownership is certainly not a bad idea. This might often be the case with specialized 
and ‘tailor-made’ facilities, such as industrial, that need continuous alterations and 
redevelopments and form only a minor part of corporate balance sheet. These kinds of 
facilities could perhaps be considered more as an input in the corporate production 
process, which means that they would often have less value in some other 
corporations use. An SLB of them could cause significant inflexibility and could also 
become extremely expensive simply because an investor would not see much residual 
value potential in these kinds of properties. Thus, lease payments of specialized 
properties and of also other property types in difficult locations could be very high 
due to the lack of alternative use and residual value. The lack of residual value also 
drives potential investors towards wanting rather long-term lease commitments from 
corporations, which creates risks concerning future flexibility needs of the 
corporation. Therefore, in many cases, it could be wise to own the specialized 
property or, in general, property types that do not have possible alternative uses or 
users. 
 
Another example of a situation when corporations should consider of owning its 
properties is if the corporation has no clear picture of how long it needs the property. 
In these kinds of situations long rental agreements contain high risks, which the 
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corporation cannot control. Another alternative in these kinds of situations could of 
course be leasing the spaces for a short-term, if possible. However, also short-term 
leases can become rather expensive especially if the investor does not see much 
residual value potential in the property.  
 
Real estate is a difficult asset to handle because of its many perspectives. One way to 
create a solid real estate strategy could be to divide real estate assets to ones that are 
very near the corporate production functions and do not have an established rental or 
investment market and to investment grade assets that have a both vibrant rental and 
investment market. The first ones could be treated only as inputs in the production 
process and the others as financial assets that are appropriate to own only if the 
corporation is in real estate business. 
 
4.5  Examination of the research results 
This thesis presented a lot of evidence on which corporations can base their real estate 
financing decisions by describing the main reasons for the major CRE disposals and 
outsourcings carried out in Europe during the past years and by finding out how these 
corporations met the goals set for these disposals. Further, based on the information 
gathered from the previous real estate disposals and outsourcings, the study built a 
framework that corporations can use when they are making decisions regarding their 
real estate ownership. It is clear that the question of whether to own or lease real 
estate can be extremely difficult and complicated, but this study brought suggestions 
and guidelines into a research area, in which research has so far been limited. 
 
The study has shown among others: 
- why corporations in general should not own their CRE and what have been the 
main drivers for real estate divestments in the past, 
- why it, nevertheless, in some cases can make sense to own CRE and how 
corporations that own a lot of real estate justify their strategy to own CRE, 
- when corporations should carry out their real estate divestments and how 
corporations can maximize the value of their CRE when they are thinking of 
divesting CRE, 
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- how corporations can obtain operational flexibility to their freehold and 
leasehold real estate portfolios, 
- what kinds of difficulties corporations might face and have faced in the SLB 
procedures and how the corporations can try to avoid them  
- what kinds of outsourcing techniques are nowadays available for corporations 
considering real estate divestments and 
- how the Finnish CRE disposal and SLB market has developed and what the 
future looks like. 
 
Nevertheless, in all, it is rather difficult to draw an exact line on whether to own or 
lease CRE holdings, which is natural since corporations can be in totally different 
situations when they are considering their real estate ownership strategies. Thus, there 
cannot be a single solution for every corporation and corporations should see the 
thoughts presented only as basic guidelines to follow.  
 
Further, as pointed out during this study it is definitely clear that previous research in 
the field of CRE management and finance is rather limited and that this subject should 
be studied more. The question of whether to own or lease real estate has several 
different points of view and the answer is always dependable on many factors such as 
the corporation’s profitability, its growth prospects, its future need and use for the 
premises in question, timing of the divestment and property market conditions. 
Corporations should also be able to see the situation from the potential investors’ 
point of view, because if the property has a high residual value, an SLB can become 
clearly less expensive than in a situation in which the investor does not see much 
potential in the property. This often means that the properties that a corporation is 
divesting should have also other possible uses and users.  
 
It is also very difficult to assess how well a corporation has achieved its goals when 
carrying out large-scale real estate sale and leasebacks since in many cases the real 
success will be seen only in the long-run and not during the first couple of years after 
the transaction. Also since a large number of the data in this doctoral thesis is based 
on interviews of different parties, it is similarly important to notice that some of 
interviewees might have had a temptation to give biased information during the 
interviews. This problem was tackled by choosing the interviewees from different 
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sides of the table in each of the real estate sale and leaseback transactions that were 
analyzed (sellers, buyers, advisors etc.). 
 
In all, a large amount of literature was reviewed, a significant amount of professionals 
was interviewed and a large amount of quantitative data was gathered and analyzed 
during the research to be able to provide as accurate results as possible.  
 
4.6  Further research 
There are several things that need further research concerning CRE ownership and 
corporate performance. First and the most interestingly, the source of the positive 
SLB reactions on shareholder value should be studied throughout. What determines 
the magnitude of abnormal return? What is the role of hidden value in this context and 
are the stock markets unable to see to actual market values of CRE?  
 
Additionally, it would be extremely interesting to see more studies about SLBs effect 
on the corporate performance in the long run? Are there any long-term advantages 
from real estate outsourcing? In this context it might be interesting to see more 
evidence on the CRE disposal impacts on corporate performance ratios and how the 
corporations that have outsourced their entire real estate holdings have succeeded in 
building flexibility into their real estate portfolios. Also CRE outsourcings’ impact on 
corporate occupancy costs should be studied throughout. 
 
Thus, there are a lot of issues yet to be studied in the field of CRE management and 
outsourcing especially in Europe. The European researchers and corporations should 
finally understand the significant role of CRE as an important part of corporate asset 
base and at the same time as an input in the corporate production process. Thus, this 
subject should be studied throughout. The corporations that notice the potential that 
lies on their real estate holdings can make their capital use, space use and asset 
management more efficient and have a clear competitive advantage.   
 
In all, this study has shown that it is definitely possible to create competitive 
advantage and added value by more efficient CRE asset management. Therefore, it is 
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extremely important that corporations begin at least from now on to pay appropriate 
attention to the management of one of their largest investments and cost items. 
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